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An Assessment of U.S. Responses to Greenwashing
and Proposals to Improve Enforcement

By: Ashley Lorance

I.

Introduction
Consumers are conscious of their ability to impact the environment through their
spending power. As buying “green” has become increasingly mainstream, greenwashing, or the
practice of companies disingenuously spinning their products as environmentally friendly, has
become a problem. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in its Green Guides, takes on the
problem of greenwashing. However, its enforcement of violations of the Guides has been
minimal.
This paper will assess the current U.S. response to greenwashing in general, and
specifically, FTC enforcement of the Green Guides. Based on this assessment, the paper will
make proposals for the FTC to strengthen enforcement of greenwashing violations, including the
adoption of international standards into the Green Guides and the provision of citizen suit
enforcement of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

II.

The Problem of Greenwashing
Consumers, aware of their power to impact the environment through the power of the
purse, are generally motivated to buy more environmentally-friendly products.1 This is true even
in the face of increased prices for such products.2 Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s,

1

Robert B. White, Note, Preemption in Green Marketing: The Case for Uniform Federal
Marketing Definitions, 85 IND. L.J. 325, 325 (2010).
2
Id. White cites studies which show that a majority of consumers are willing to pay five percent
more for environmentally-friendly products.
Id. (citing David F. Welsh, Comment,
Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law: Eliminating the “Gray” Behind
the “Green,” 81 CAL. L. REV. 991, 992 (1993) (“[R]ecent surveys have found that eighty-two
percent of American consumers would pay at least five percent extra for ‘environmentally
friendly’ products . . . .”); Press Release, Performics, Performics Survey Finds 60 Percent of
Online Consumers Consider Environmental Consciousness an Important Company Trait (Apr. 8,
2008), http://www. performics.com/news-room/press-releases/research- consumer-opinions-ongreen-marketing/674 (“Eighty-three percent [of consumers] indicated they are extremely or very
1

manufacturers responded to this growing demand by increasingly using green marketing claims,
or marketing information regarding the positive environmental attributes of their products.3
However, these claims often contained false or misleading information about the environmental
attributes of a company’s goods or services, 4 a practice that has become known as
“greenwashing.”5 In fact, a 2007 environmental marketing survey found that out of 1,018
consumer products with environmental claims, all but one had made false or misleading claims. 6
The most common deceptive trick found in the study, representing 57% of the deceptive claims,
involved a hidden trade-off, or suggesting a product is “green” based on a single attribute that is
unsupported by a more complete environmental analysis of the product.7
Greenwashing is difficult for consumers to recognize for multiple reasons. It is often
difficult for consumers to detect because they lack the ability to confirm the claim. 8 Consumers
also do not have sophisticated knowledge about certain environmental attributes, such as carbon
footprints, and may be easily mislead.9 Finally, consumers have cognitive biases that affect their

likely to choose the environmentally friendly option. . . . [and] our survey shows that nearly half
of them will pay at least five percent more for [it].”)).
3
Glenn Isreal, Comment, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards for
Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 303, 303 (1993). For instance,
between 1989 and 1990, green marketing claims on labels more than doubled, and claims in TV
and print advertising more than tripled. Id. (citing Selling Green, Consumer Reports, Oct. 1991,
at 687).
4
TERRACHOICE ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING INC., THE “SIX SINS OF GREENWASHINGTM”: A
STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS IN NORTH AMERICAN CONSUMER MARKETS 1 (2007).
5
Id. TerraChoice defines “greenwashing” as “the act of misleading consumers regarding the
environmental practices of a company or the environmental benefits of a product or service.” Id.
6
Id. From the study, TerraChoice identified “six sins of greenwashing”: (1) hidden trade-off, (2)
no proof, (3) vagueness, (4) irrelevance, (5) fibbing, and (6) lesser of two evils. Id.
Explanations and examples of each “sin” are included within the report. See id. at 1-4.
7
Id. at 2.
8
White, supra note 1, at 326.
9
Rebecca
Tushnet’s
43(B)log:
False
Advertising
and
More,
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2009/03/hofstra-conference-on-energy-and.html (Mar. 21, 2009,
14:34 EST) [hereinafter Tushnet Blog].
2

recognition of whether information is false or misleading. For instance, consumers often want to
feel good about a product they have bought, so they may ignore the negative attributes about it.10
Another bias is that familiarity with any claim breeds trust in that claim, because memory of the
source of the claim fades faster than the actual memory of the claim. 11 These are just some of
the reasons why limited or distracting green claims work, and why manufacturers and marketers
are tempted to use them.
By tainting the product information received, greenwashing confuses consumers and
decreases consumer confidence. 12 It also destroys the legitimacy of consumers’ market choice.
In other words, greenwashing does damage to the notion of the consumer as “market voter,”
since consumers are denied the information with which to make an informed “market vote.”13
Because of these harmful effects, the U.S. and states regulate false advertising and marketing
claims, including greenwashing. 14

10

Id.
Id.
12
Id.
13
See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 526 (2004) (“In essence, individuals
who are motivated to participate in public debates become subjected to a double bind, denied on
the one hand an informational basis for seeking to incentivize changes through their market
behavior, yet expected on the other hand to reveal their "vote" in favor of public goods while
acting in that very capacity.”); see also Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences,
Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 383 (1998) (“In
other words, the value of any good is determined by estimating the amount of money with which
people might be willing to part in order to satisfy their preference for it.”). In addition to these
effects on the consumer, regulation ensures a level field for manufacturers on which to compete.
Cf. William Kovacic, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), Opening Remarks at
the FTC Green Guides and Packaging Workshop 12 (Apr. 30, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/packaging/transcript.pdf) (speaking about the FTC’s input
from the competition policy perspective) [hereinafter FTC Green Packaging Workshop].
14
Initially, one of the main goals of regulation was reducing consumer confusion. See J. Thomas
Rosch, Comm’r, FTC, Responsible Green Marketing, Address at the American Conference
Institute’s Regulatory Summit for Advertisers and Marketers 5 (June 18, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080618greenmarketing.pdf (“Ultimately, the issuance of
11
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III.

U.S. Regulation of Greenwashing
Although the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought cases challenging deceptive
environmental advertising claims pursuant to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTCA) starting in the 1970s, it was the proliferation of greenwashing in the late 1980s that
prompted increased regulatory action from federal, state and local authorities.15 By the 1990s,
the result of this multi-level approach was clear: businesses were confused, states were still
concerned about deceptive claims, and consumers were distrustful of environmental claims. 16
Each of these groups shared an interest in gaining more information and ensuring more truthful
claims to encourage the growth of green products.17 To secure this interest, they pressured the
FTC to issue nationwide industry guidance.18 The FTC complied, working with the
Environmental Protection Agency and state attorneys general to create the 1992 FTC Guides for
the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, commonly known as the “Green Guides.”19
Section 5 of the FTCA and the Green Guides are the main regulatory mechanisms
controlling greenwashing. Other responses include the federal Lanham Act,20 state “mini-FTC”

national industry-wide guidance for environmental marketing claims was recognized as a way to
promote truthful and substantiated advertising while providing certainty in the marketplace for
both advertisers and consumers.”) [hereinafter Rosch, Responsible Green Marketing Remarks].
However, regulators have now realized the potential for what scholars call the “market vote.”
See FTC Green Packaging Workshop, supra note 13, at 43 (“Perhaps though the most important
trend concerns the consumer and the consumer understanding an expectation. . . . The consumer
today wants to do something. There is an imperative. The consumer wants to make choices and
believes that the purchasing choices can actually drive policy, make a significant or meaningful
impact on the environment, and that is the expectation of the consumer.”).
15
See Roscoe B. Starek, III, Comm’r, FTC, Remarks before the Alliance for Beverage Cartons
and
the
Environmental
Symposium
(Dec.
4,
1996),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/starek/egstarek.shtm [hererinafter Starek speech].
16
See id.
17
See Isreal, supra note 3, at 304.
18
Id.
19
Id. The Guides may be found at 16 C.F.R. § 260 (2010).
20
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2010).
4

laws, industry self-regulation, and consumer oversight groups. These are discussed in turn
below.
A. Regulation by the Federal Government
Federal regulation of greenwashing is achieved in two main ways. First, the government
regulates deceptive advertising through Section 5 of the FTCA. Regarding environmental
marketing claims in particular, the FTC Green Guides provide guidance to companies. The
second method of regulation is private lawsuits enforcing the Lanham Act. This allows
competitors of products to bring suit to ensure fair marketing standards.
1. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
The basic consumer protection statute enforced by the FTC is Section 5(a) of the FTCA,
which declares unlawful “unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce” and gives the FTC enforcement authority over such acts.21
What is an “unfair” method of competition is determined by the particular environmental and
marketing context of the practice at issue and the public interest at issue.22 The act or practice
must cause or be likely to cause “substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers
or to competition.”23
The FTC enforces its consumer protection laws through both judicial and administrative
means. Administratively, the FTC can choose to either make rules or to enforce existing statutes
and rules. Rulemaking proceedings allow the FTC to prescribe and remedy unfair deceptive

21

15 U.S.C. § 45.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 532, 533 (1935); Korber Hats, Inc. v.
Fed. Trade Comm’n, 311 F.2d 358, 360-61 (1st Cir. 1962).
23
15 U.S.C. § 45(n). Public policy considerations may be considered, but may not be the
primary consideration. Id.
22

5

practices on an industry-wide basis. 24 In administrative enforcement, the FTC may file a
complaint setting forth its charges if it determines that a particular company’s practice is
unlawful. 25 The respondent may sign a consent order or proceed to administrative trial. 26 After
an administrative order is issued, the FTC may additionally seek civil penalties in district court
for the harm at issue in the administrative proceeding that caused injury to consumers27. To do
so, it must prove that a reasonable man would have known the act was dishonest.28
Alternatively, the FTC may seek civil remedies or consumer redress for violations of its
cease and desist orders or trade regulations directly in district court under Section 13(b) of the
FTCA, without first making an administrative determination. 29 Furthermore, the FTC may
request a preliminary or permanent injunction for impending violations of the FTCA upon
completion of the administrative proceeding.30 A suit under Section 13(b) is often preferable to
the adjudicatory process because the court may award “both prohibitory and monetary equitable
relief in one step” and issue an injunction with immediate effect (as opposed to having to wait 60
days for a cease and desist order to take effect).31
2.

FTC Green Guides
The FTC Green Guides provide industry guidance on all implied or express

environmental marketing or advertising claims, including symbols, labeling, logos, depictions,
24

Federal Trade Commission, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Investigative
and
Law
Enforcement
Authority
(July
2008)
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm [hereinafter FTC Overview].
25
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b); see also FTC Overview, supra note 24.
26
FTC Overview, supra note 24.
27
Id.
28
15 U.S.C. § 57(b); FTC Overview, supra note 24. The FTC may also seek penalties from nonrespondents if they had actual knowledge that the act was deceptive and unlawful. 15 U.S.C. §
45(m)(1)(B); FTC Overview, supra note 24.
29
15 U.S.C. § 53(b); FTC Overview, supra note 24.
30
15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
31
FTC Overview, supra note 24.
6

and brand names.32 They were created after industry pressure for more guidance on green
marketing claims. 33 Authority for the Guides derives from the FTCA.34 The Green Guides,
like other industry guides, are administrative interpretations of the law and thus do not have
the force and effect of law.35 However, if the FTC determines that a business makes
environmental marketing claims that are inconsistent with the Guides, it can take action under
the FTCA. 36 The Guides do not preempt federal agencies or state bodies, but compliance with
federal, state, or local laws does not preclude the FTC from taking action under Section 5 of
the FTCA. 37
The substance of the Green Guides provides guidance on making certain environmental
claims, with specific examples that provide safe harbors for companies.38 The gravamen of
the Green Guides is twofold: (1) the claim must be truthful, and (2) the company, at the time
the claim is made, must possess a reasonable basis to substantiate the claim. 39 After laying
out general principles concerning green marketing claims, 40 the Guides define, discuss, and

32

16 C.F.R. § 260.2 (2010). The scope of the Guides is extremely broad—they apply to all
claims for all products for all consumer uses. See id.
33
See Starek speech, supra note 15.
34
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2010).
35
16 C.F.R. § 260.2; Rosch, Responsible Green Marketing Remarks, supra note 14, at 12 n.2.
36
16 C.F.R. § 260.1.
37
16 C.F.R. § 260.2.
38
See 16 C.F.R. § 260.3.
39
See 16 C.F.R. § 260.5. Further guidance on the reasonable basis standard is set forth in the
Commission's 1983 Policy Statement on the Advertising Substantiation Doctrine. 49 Fed. Reg.
30999 (1984); appended to Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984).
40
16 C.F.R. § 260.6. This section advises that qualifications and disclosures should be clear,
prominent and understandable; that distinctions between a product, benefit and service must be
clear; environmental attributes should not be overstated; and that comparative claims must be
clear and substantiated. Id.
7

give examples of deceptive environmental claims for products that are biodegradable,
compostable, recyclable, have recycled content, reduce waste, and are ozone friendly. 41
The FTC evaluates claims through the eyes of the consumer.42 For example, the Green
Guides prescribe that products cannot advertise that a product is “recyclable” if no recycling
facilities or collection sites exist for that product within a certain area.43 Statements such as
“please recycle” or “please check for recycling programs in your area” would not be
sufficient, because consumers think that a recycling program exists.44 Instead, the product
must qualify the claim by saying something like “recycling programs for this product may not
exist in your area,” so that a consumer is not mislead into thinking such a program actually
exists.45
Since the Guides were created in 1992, new environmental claims have flourished,
especially with regard to products’ carbon impact and claims that a product is sustainable or
renewable. 46 “Environmentally friendly” product launches have recently spiked, and patent
applications involving “eco” or “green” claims have also jumped.47 These general

41

16 C.F.R. § 260.7.
Laura DeMartino, Assistant Director, Enforcement Division of FTC, Remarks at the Hofstra
Law School Energy and the Environment Conference Panel Discussion: A Threat to Consumer
Empowerment:
Greenwashing,
(Mar.
20,
2009),
webcast
available
at
http://www.livestream.com/hofstralaw/video?clipId=flv_864476af-27be-44b5-8dfcc290196b9965 [hereinafter, DeMartino Remarks].
43
See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(d).
44
DeMartino Remarks, supra note 42.
45
See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(d) ex. 4.
46
DeMartino Remarks, supra note 42; Rosch, Responsible Green Marketing Remarks, supra
note 14, at 11. Some of the questions that companies are struggling with can be found at
Jonathan Martel & Clara Vondrich, Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 2008
Emerging Issues 65 (2008).
47
CBS Evening News reported that manufacturers launched 328 “environmentally friendly”
products in 2007, up from only 5 such products in 2002. CBS Evening News, A Closer Look at
‘Green’ Products, May 18, 2008,available at
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/05/18/eveningnews/main4105507.shtml. The U.S. Patent and
42

8

environmental claims are likely to be unsubstantiated; as such, the Green Guides recommend
avoiding their use.48 These trends are also an indication that greenwashing is not being abated
by the Green Guides, but instead is growing.
To keep up to date with these changes in marketplace terminology, the FTC is revising its
Green Guides. 49 Currently, the comment process has ended and the FTC is reviewing and
summarizing the 150 comments it received. 50 It is also considering feedback from three
workshops it held in 2008 on various green marketing topics.51 These workshops included
‘Green Building and Textiles,’ ‘Green Packaging Claims,’ and ‘Carbon Offsets and
Renewable Energy Certificates.’52 Some of the themes raised by the comments received
include: whether life cycle analysis for claims involving carbon footprints should be used,
whether the current guides provide enough guidance, how claims of “biodegradability” and
“recyclability” can be improved, and whether “sustainable” is too vague or if it is definable. 53
As discussed in this paper, before issuing its revised Green Guides, the FTC should consider
using its rulemaking authority to promulgate regulations setting out national standards
implementing International Standards Office (ISO) definitions for such claims.

Trademark Office received twice as many applications with the word “green” in 2007 than in
2006, and applications with the words “clean,” “eco,” “environment,” “earth,” “planet,” and
“organic” also jumped. GreenBiz Staff, Eco Trademarks Made Big Gains in 2007, Apr. 28,
2008,
www.greenbiz.com/news/2008/04/28/eco-trademarks-made-big-gains-2007.
48
See 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (using the terms “environmentally safe” and “environmentally
preferable” as examples).
49
Federal Trade Commission, Eco in the Market: Green Guide Review,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/energy/about_guides.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
50
Rosch, Responsible Green Marketing Remarks, supra note 14, at 8-9. Comments are
accessible on the FTC website at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/energy/about_guides.
51
Federal Trade Commission, Eco in the Market: Green Guide Review,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/energy/about_guides.shtml.
52
Id.
53
Rosch, Responsible Green Marketing Remarks, supra note 14, at 9-12.
9

3. FTC Enforcement of Green Marketing Claims
FTC Enforcement of green marketing claims has been minimal. From 1999 to 2000, the
FTC brought 37 administrative enforcement actions challenging environmental marketing
claims. 54 From 2000 to 2009, the FTC filed no such claims; however, since 2009, it has filed
seven claims. 55 Recent enforcement actions indicate that the FTC attacks certain types of
environmental marketing claims at a time. For instance, three of the 2009 cases involved
companies that made misleading claims of biodegradability. 56 The four other 2009 cases
challenged companies making claims regarding bamboo fabric.57 Besides bringing these
cases, the FTC issued 78 letters to companies warning them to stop labeling rayon fabrics as

54

Federal Trade Commission, Energy and Environment, http://www.ftc.gov/energy/ (last visited
Apr. 6, 2010) (follow “Environment” hyperlink; then follow “Enforcement” hyperlink); Rosch,
Responsible Green Marketing Remarks, supra note 14, at 14.
55
Id. Notably, the 2000 to 2009 enforcement void corresponds to the years of the Bush
administration.
56
See Tender Corp., C-4261 (July 13, 2009) (challenging biodegradable claims for moist wipes);
Kmart Corp., C-4263 (July 15, 2009) (challenging biodegradable claims for disposable plates);
Dyna-E International, Inc., et al., D-9336 (Dec. 15, 2009) (challenging biodegradable claims for
compressed dry towels); see also Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Announces
Actions Against Kmart, Tender and Dyna-E Alleging Deceptive ‘Biodegradable’ Claims (June 9,
2009), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/kmart.shtm.
57
See The M Group, Inc., et al., D-9340 (Aug. 11, 2009) (challenging claims that company’s
textile fiber products, including clothing for infants, are made of bamboo fiber, retain the natural
antimicrobial properties of the bamboo plant, and are biodegradable); CSE, Inc., et al., C-4276
(Dec. 15, 2009) (challenging claims that company’s textile fiber products are made of bamboo
fiber, are manufactured using an environmentally-friendly process, and retain the natural
antimicrobial properties of the bamboo plant); Pure Bamboo, LLC, et al., C-4274 (Dec. 15,
2009) (challenging claims that company’s textile fiber products, including clothing, are made of
bamboo fiber, are manufactured using an environmentally-friendly process, retain the natural
antimicrobial properties of the bamboo plant, and are biodegradable); Sami Designs, LLC, et al.,
C-4275 (Dec. 15, 2009) (challenging claims that company’s textile fiber products, including
clothing, are made of bamboo fiber, are manufactured using an environmentally-friendly process,
and retain the natural antimicrobial properties of the bamboo plant). The FTC challenged these
claims of biodegradability and environmental friendliness because the fabric production used
toxic chemicals that resulted in hazardous air emissions and produced rayon instead of bamboo
fabric. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, How to Avoid Bamboozling Your Customers,
(Aug. 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/alerts/alt172.shtm.
10

bamboo.58 Since 2000, the FTC has also filed several actions regarding claims relating to
energy efficiency. 59
In addition, there are two cases currently in litigation regarding “green” claims. 60 One
involves the marketer of a coating that advertised that if a consumer painted with it, the
coating would have insulation properties with energy savings of 40-60%.61 Another involves
a business that advertised that its device could turn any car into a hybrid car which would
have 50-100% greater fuel efficiency. 62 In both of these cases, the FTC alleges that the
companies have no evidence to back up their claims.63 The limited number and subject of
FTC enforcement actions, especially compared with the growing incidence of greenwashing,64
reveal that the FTC is not sufficiently enforcing claims. Such limited enforcement is due to its
budget constraints, which force it to pursue major deceptive claims. 65 As discussed in this
paper, the enactment of a citizen suit provision within the FTCA would alleviate the FTC’s
burden in bringing these suits and reallocate it to the public.

58

Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Warns 78 Retailers, Including Wal-Mart,
Target, and Kmart, to Stop Labeling and Advertising Rayon Textile Products as “Bamboo” (Feb.
3, 2010), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2010/02/bamboo.shtm.
59
See, e.g., U.S. v. Northwestern Ohio Foam Packaging, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:06-cv-02407
(filed Oct. 5, 2006) (alleging that an insulation made exaggerated R-value claims for its
insulation product); F.T.C. v. Intl. Research and Dev. Corp. of Nevada, et al., Case No.:
04C 6901 (filed Oct. 7, 2004) (alleging deceptive claims about an “automatic fuel saver” device);
In the Matter of Kryton Coatings Intl., Inc., Docket No. C-4052, File No. 012 3060 (decision
issued June 14, 2002) (alleging unsubstantiated performance and R-value claims for building
coatings).
60
DeMartino Remarks, supra note 42.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See supra note 47.
65
See Kevin M. Lemley, Resolving the Circuit Split on Standing in False Advertising Claims
and Incorporation of Prudential Standing in State Deceptive Trade Practices Law: The Quest for
Optimal Levels of Accurate Information in the Marketplace, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
283, 317 (2007).
11

B. Regulation by States and Private Citizens: Mini-FTCs
Many states have enacted trade practice statutes modeled after the FTCA. 66 These
statutes provide for injunctions and civil and criminal penalties for misleading advertising.67 In
the mid-1990s, states engaged in cooperative, multi-state efforts to combat greenwashing. 68
Most of the cases ended in settlement.69 The cooperative approach these states took was
necessary because of the national scope of the problem. For instance, most green marketing
campaigns are launched nationally because state-by-state prosecution of such huge marketers is
inefficient, given the vast resources these companies expend on advertising nationally. 70 In
addition to inefficiencies, state-by-state litigation may also result in disparities that “ultimately
confuse rather than clarify,” so that manufacturers are required to simply comply with the
highest state standard.71 For example, at least two states require advertisers to maintain
documentation concerning the validity of environmental claims. 72 This is the reason why a
comprehensive federal approach is necessary. 73

66

See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500-09 (West 2010); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2
(2010); N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 2010); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349-50
(McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2010); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.41-17.826 (West 2009 &
Supp. 2010).
67
Id.
68
Isreal, supra note 3, at 313 (1993).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 314.
71
Delcianna J. Winders, Combining Reflexive Law and False Advertising Law to Standardize
“Cruelty-Free” Labeling of Cosmetics, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 454, 473 n.91 (2006).
72
Christopher P. McCormack, The FTC’s “Green Guides” and the Challenges of Environmental
Marketing, 41 Trends (A.B.A. Sec. of Env’t, Energy, and Resources Newsl. 9 (2010) (citing
FLA. STAT. § 403.7193(1) (2010); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17580(a) (2010)).
73
See id. at 313-14.
12

Some of these state statutes allow for citizen suits to enforce the provisions of the
statutes.74 Such citizen suit provisions help bring down the cost of enforcement by allowing
private citizens to enforce the statute.75 If attorneys’ fees are provided within the statute, these
suits have the added benefit of shifting the cost of enforcement to the industry that benefits from
such deceptive practices. However, state citizen suit provisions are inefficient for the same
reasons that state-by-state enforcement by attorneys general is inefficient. Therefore, a federal
citizen suit provision is preferable.
C. Regulation by Competitors: The Lanham Act
Section 43 of the Lanham Act deals with trademark issues and false advertising,
including greenwashing. 76 It has been used increasingly to combat deceptive claims. 77
However, for many reasons, the Lanham Act suffers from shortfalls that counsel against its use
as a principal mechanism to combat greenwashing.
The Lanham Act creates a private cause of action for false advertising. 78 However,
whereas the FTCA is enforceable only by the FTC, the Lanham Act is generally enforceable by
competitors of a person or company making false advertisements.79 Consumers are regularly
denied standing under the Lanham Act.80

74

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAWS § 350(e) (McKinney
Supp. 2010); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.49 (West 2010).
75
See Lemley, supra note 65, at 319-20.
76
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (2010).
77
See Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act,
79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 844 (1999).
78
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a).
79
White, supra note 1, at 329-30. Both acts prohibit “misrepresentation” and “deceptiveness.”
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce
. . . are hereby declared unlawful.”), with id. § 1125(a)(1) (“Any person who . . . misrepresents
the natures, characteristics, [or] qualities . . . of . . . goods . . . shall be liable . . . .”).
80
See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. Phillips Food, Inc., 365 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2004) (“At
least half of the circuits hold (and none of the others disagree) that . . . § 45, or 15 U.S.C. § 1127,
13

In addition to this limited enforcement capacity, the Lanham Act provides little guidance
and is wrought with conflicting case law. In fact, because of its “layers upon layers of
ambiguous wording, congressional inattention, judicial glosses, a statutory revision, and
significant scholarly developments in related areas,” it has been described as an “onion of
complexity.”81 Although the statutory language “nearly mirrors” that of the FTCA, it relies on
vague notions of “misrepresentation” without guidance such as that provided by the FTC Green
Guides.82 The Green Guides do not provide guidance to the Lanham Act on what environmental
claims are deceptive.83
The Lanham Act has also been criticized for not sufficiently protecting consumers.84
Despite the cost and uncertainty of litigation under the Lanham Act,85 false advertising claims
brought pursuant to the Act are on the rise.86 However, this does not necessarily correspond to
an increase in consumer welfare. To the contrary, these claims tend to be about highly technical
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issues that do little to protect the consumer.87 These suits do, however, presumably pass
litigation costs on to the consumer.88
Finally, the Lanham Act may be of limited assistance in dealing with complicated green
claims. Several cases brought under the Lanham Act have held that terms consumers have
limited information about cannot be false because they do not communicate information that is
specific enough. 89 In other words, if a company advertises with a technical term, that term has
no meaning to the customer and is therefore not false to the customer.90 For example, in one
recent case, the court rejected a challenge to Mitsubishi’s advertisement of a 1080p television set
because the phrase “1080p” “does not convey a specific claim that is recognizable to the targeted
customer,” rather, it simply indicated a technologically sophisticated TV set.91
D. Self-Regulation
Some companies regulate themselves through professional organizations, or by
complying with certification and labeling schemes.
1. National Advertising Division
The main example of this self-regulation is the National Advertising Division (NAD) of
the Better Business Bureau, which covers the self-regulation of advertising companies. NAD
reviews national advertising claims on its own initiative, or upon complaint by other
advertisers or consumers.92 NAD has a staff of seven attorneys that handle about 150 cases
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per year.93 Once NAD makes a determination about a particular company’s advertisement,
the company has an opportunity to appeal.94 If it fails to comply or loses the appeal, NAD
turns the company in to the FTC, which usually results in a negative determination.95
Although NAD is an effective alternative to federal litigation, it also has several
shortfalls. 96 First, since it has no enforcement authority, it relies on self-regulation by
advertisers or the FTC to regulate.97 This creates a dependence on a financially-strapped
agency. Second, it does not offer monetary relief to consumers. 98 Finally, it does not allow
for public notice of companies engaging in deceptive practice. This is because its proceedings
are confidential, and thus prohibit publicity. 99
2. Certification and Labeling Schemes
Some businesses also engage in voluntary certification and labeling. According to
EcoLabeling.org, an organization that inventories eco-labels, there are currently 325 separate
eco-labels worldwide.100 The most widely known examples are GreenSeal and EnergyStar.101
These labels work differently, but they typically require payment of a fee and testing. 102 The
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stringent testing sometimes involved or high fees can discourage smaller companies from
certifying new products.103 Other criticisms involve potential World Treaty Organization
violations, effectiveness concerns, and concerns that such labels hurt production in third world
countries. 104 Finally, while eco-labeling is generally positive, too many labels can confuse
consumers and decrease the value of the label. 105
E. Oversight by the Public
The public also plays a role in regulating green marketing claims and discouraging
greenwashing. Numerous environmental groups and consumer watchdog groups promulgate
online websites, forums, blogs and resources to help consumers gain knowledge about
environmental claims and identify greenwashing. One of the most prominent examples is the
Greenwashing Index, run through the University of Oregon. 106 The Index allows the public to
upload, rate, and comment on advertisements making dubious environmental claims. Such a
novel form of media is changing the way companies gain information about consumer
knowledge and opinion and allowing unprecedented public participation in the green marketing
dialogue.107 Other groups include mainstream environmental groups such as Greenpeace,
Friends of the Earth, Co-op America, and consumer watchdog groups such as CorpWatch and
GreenBiz.108
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IV.

Reducing Greenwashing Through International Standards and Federal Citizen Suits
Two simple changes could help reduce greenwashing. First, the FTC should take the
opportunity in updating its Green Guides to adopt international standards for environmental
labeling and declarations. Second, Congress should amend the FTCA to provide standing for
private citizens to enforce the statute. Imposing international standards will not only help bring
about a consensus on what constitutes deceptive environmental marketing claims, it will also
help consumers trust the claims they are receiving and businesses to compete better
internationally. Amending the FTCA to allow for citizen suits will help stretch the FTC
enforcement budget and allow for more democratic participation in the regulation of deceptive
companies. Together, these two actions will help fight greenwashing and improve consumer
confidence in environmentally-friendly products.
A. Adopting International Standards for Environmental Labeling and Declarations into
the FTC Green Guides
The updating of the Green Guides provides the perfect opportunity for the FTC to
provide more guidance, certainty, and uniformity to companies making environmental claims
by adopting international standards, as set out by the International Standards Office (ISO) in
the ISO 14000 series environmental labeling and declaration guidelines (ISO 14020-25).
The ISO is a specialized international non-governmental agency whose members consist of
national standards bodies of 159 countries.109 ISO develops voluntary standards in almost all
industries with the input of government, industry, and other interested parties to ensure
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“materials, products, processes, and services are fit for their purpose” and to “facilitate
international trade by increasing the reliability and effectiveness of goods and services.”110
The ISO 14000 series deals with environmental management systems, and ISO 1420-25
deals specifically with environmental labeling and declaration standards. 111 ISO 14021
would be the most relevant standard to incorporate into the Green Guides, as it covers selfdeclared environmental claims (or Type II labeling), as opposed to third party eco-labeling
programs like EnergyStar (Type I labeling in ISO 14024) or third party lifecycle assessment
certifications (Type III declarations in ISO 14025). The ISO 14021 standard provide
consensus descriptions and guidance for common terminology such as “reduced water
consumption,” “extended life product,” and numerous other terms, whereas the FTC Green
Guides only provide guidance for seven environmental claims. 112 The ISO 14021 standard
also offers clarification of verification standards for environmental claims. 113 During the
FTC’s Green Packaging Workshop, industry brought up both of these issues—terminology
and verification standards—as areas the FTC needed to address.114 Finally, the ISO standard
provides eighteen different requirements that are similar to the ‘general principles’ section of
the Green Guides.115 Thus, the standard is similar to the current Green Guides, but provides
expanded terminology, verification standards, and guidelines for companies to avoid making
false or misleading environmental claims.
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1. The Need for Adoption of International Standards
Adopting the ISO standards into the FTC Green Guides has several implications that
would benefit businesses, the government, and consumers. One benefit would be regulatory
advantages. For instance, the FTC could offer reduced penalties to companies that become
ISO-certified, or consider ISO compliance a safe harbor in any FTC enforcement action.116
In fact, the FTC already recognizes industry self-regulation as an important factor in
prosecuting claims. 117 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has used a similar
approach.118 In addition, companies might gain competitive trading advantages if
governments or other customers used ISO-certified companies as preferred suppliers. 119
In fact, regulated industry has indicated that it would welcome the push for
internationally-based national standards. In the recent FTC Green Packaging Workshop, the
issue of adopting international standards, namely ISO standards, came up frequently. 120 All
of the members who brought up the subject were in favor of the Green Guides adopting the
ISO standards.121 The main reasons cited were certainty, economic advantages, and the
stimulation of environmental improvements.122 The same concerns were echoed in the initial
push for the Green Guides and in comments for the current revisions of the Green Guides.123
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Other advantages of adopting international standards include the enhanced ability to
efficiently produce and market a product, and to boost sales by increasing consumer
confidence. 124
FTC adoption of ISO 14020-25 into its Green Guides has not only been proposed by
industry; it has also been proposed by the U.S. government. The U.S. sub-Technical
Advisory Group of the ISO requested that the FTC consider “harmonizing” the FTC
environmental marketing guides with the ISO 14020-25 environmental labeling guidelines. 125
It was also the subject of a congressional hearing entitled ‘The Increasing Importance of
International Standards to the U.S. Industrial Community and the Impact of ISO 14000,’
which touted adoption of the standards as a way to introduce flexibility and cost-savings. 126
Consumers would also benefit from these international standards. This is because
implementation would expand the guidance currently in the Green Guides and increase
uniformity in environmental claims from advertisers. Consumers would benefit from this
because they typically trust a standard that they know.127 As Professor Tushnet notes, this is
one reason why nutrition labels work so well and inspire such consumer confidence.128 An
international standard would create confidence in several ways. First, it would ensure the
124
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mass dissemination of a uniform standard, thus creating familiarity. 129 Consumers view such
claims as having been vetted and trustworthy. 130 Second, use of the same standard or format
increases credibility (e.g., nutrition labels). 131 Finally, it would decrease inconsistency, which
“signals ulterior motives and heightens skepticism” in consumers.132
One organization that is able to take on such a task, together with the FTC, is the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the main American non-governmental
organization that engages in world-wide standard-setting and testing. ANSI could provide a
wealth of experience and expertise in helping implement such international standards into
national definitions. 133
2.

Potential Problems with International Standards

Although several potential problems exist with imposing international environmental
marketing standards, these are easily dismissed.
a. Congressional Authority
Congress has clear authority to delegate rulemaking authority to promulgate
national environmental marketing definitions conforming to international standards
through the Commerce Clause. The FTC, in turn, has clear authority to impose these
standards through its authority under Section 5 of the FTC t. Although certain practical
considerations such as flexibility to encourage new environmental products swayed the
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FTC in adopting only industry guidelines, the prevailing interest in trustworthy
environmental marketing standards is sufficiently strong to counter that concern. A
2008 Price Waterhouse Cooper survey found that only sixteen percent of consumers
trust environmental claims from manufacturers.134 Such sagging consumer confidence
is the very reason the FTCA was put into place. It is time for the FTC to step up its
rulemaking authority and act by imposing international environmental marketing
standards.
b. First Amendment Protection
While the debate on First Amendment protection of commercial speech is
ongoing,135 deceptive claims have no such claim to constitutional protection. False
claims have never held the right to First Amendment protection precisely because it
has no value in the democracy of ideas.136 By regulating against deceptive practices,
the FTC is not in danger of any First Amendment constitutional violations.137
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c. Preemption of State Statutes
As discussed above, the FTC does not preempt state statutes. In fact, states
provide an often helpful supplementary role in enforcing the FTCA through their
“mini-FTC” statutes.138 Such a cooperative system of governance would be further
helped by standardized national definitions, which would provide more guidance to
states in challenging deceptive environmental marketing claims. 139
B. Federal Citizen Suits
Over the years, the FTC’s enforcement authority has been greatly expanded.140 While
Congress has provided the FTC with increased funds,141 the Commission is still not bringing
many enforcement actions. 142 To remedy this problem, Congress should follow the approach
of many state “mini-FTC” statutes and amend the FTCA to allow citizen suits to recover
actual damages for deceptive advertising practices. Such an approach will increase
enforcement while keeping FTC’s costs at a minimum, thereby challenging deceptive
marketing claims and increasing consumer confidence.
Citizen suits have a long history in aiding the government in law enforcement.143 They
are currently used in many environmental statutes, including the Clean Water Act, which is
the model for many other citizen suit provisions. Citizen suits proliferate because
138
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governments are often not able or willing to properly enforce laws for a variety of reasons,
including “bureaucratic, political, financial, or logistical constraints.”144 Citizen suits not
only increase enforcement by supplementing the government’s role and allowing suits by
private attorneys general, they also can encourage government enforcement by highlighting
certain claims, products or firms that require more enforcement.145 Furthermore, they provide
greater deterrence by allowing more people, including consumers of “green” products, to
bring suit against advertisers making false environmental claims.
V.

Conclusion
As shown by the legislative history leading to the FTC Green Guides, a strong national
approach is needed to combat deceptive environmental marketing claims, or greenwashing.
While several federal and state schemes exist to combat the problem, one of the main avenues
for enforcement, FTC enforcement through Section 5 of the FTCA, could be improved by
implementing certain changes. These changes should include provision within the FTCA for
citizen suits and for adopting ISO standards into the FTC Green Guides. By implementing these
changes, lagging consumer confidence in green marketing claims could be improved. With
improved consumer confidence, companies will be more likely to produce more
environmentally-friendly products and consumers will be more willing to buy them. With more
environmentally-friendly products being bought and sold, the consumer is better able to do his or
her part in fighting climate change.
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